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OR the first time in many years, the focus of Texas courts in many
of the most important insurance decisions during the Survey period
was the construction and interpretation of basic policy provisions.
I. EXTRACONTRACTUAL LIABILITY
A. VICARIOUs LIABILITY FOR DEFENSE COUNSEL'S MALPRACTICE
One of the most talked-about decisions to come out of the Supreme
Court during the Survey period was State Farm Mutual Automobile Insur-
ance Co. v. Traver.' In Traver, vehicles driven by Mary Davidson and
Calvin Klause collided. Both Davidson and Klause were insured by State
Farm. Mary Jordan, Klause's passenger, was severely injured in the acci-
dent. State Farm hired separate attorneys to defend Davidson and
Klause after Jordan sued both drivers. At trial, the jury found Davidson
solely responsible for the accident. Davidson died shortly after trial. The
executor of her estate, Ronald Traver, sued State Farm, alleging negli-
gence, breach of the duty to defend, breach of the Stowers2 duty, breach
of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and violations of both the De-
ceptive Trade Practice Act (DTPA) and Insurance Code. Traver alleged
that Charles Bradshaw, Davidson's appointed defense attorney, commit-
ted malpractice by failing to attend key depositions and failing to offer a
meaningful defense at trial. Traver also alleged that State Farm deliber-
ately orchestrated Bradshaw's legal malpractice in order to avoid imposi-
tion of potential Stowers liability arising out of failed settlement
* B.A., Baylor University; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at law,
Strasburger & Price, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
1. 980 S.W.2d 625 (Tex. 1998). The Supreme Court originally issued its opinion in
Traver on August 25, 1998. See 41 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1343 1998 WL 531685 (Aug. 25, 1998).
The August opinion was withdrawn on December 31, 1998 and replaced by the current
opinion. The primary difference between the two opinions is the removal of earlier cita-
tions to the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct and commentary suggesting
that "an insurer has the right to control the insured's defense" in the absence of a coverage
dispute. 41 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 1344-45. In the December opinion, the court expanded its
prior allusion to the possible imposition of liability on a carrier who breaches the duty of
good faith and fair dealing in the context of a third-party liability claim.
2. See G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1929, holding approved). Under the doctrine outlined in Stowers, an in-
sured may recover from his insurance carrier the entire amount of a judgment in excess of
policy limits rendered against him, if prior to judgment, the insurer negligently failed to
accept a settlement offer within the liability limits of the policy. A carrier is "held to that
degree of care and diligence which an ordinary prudent person would exercise in the man-
agement of his own business." Id. at 547.
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negotiations in the Jordan suit. State Farm obtained summary judgment
in its favor on all counts at trial.3 The court of appeals held that under
Ranger County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Guin,4 State Farm was responsi-
ble for Bradshaw's malpractice in handling the defense of its insured, re-
manding the negligence claims for trial along with the attendant DTPA
and Insurance Code claims.5 The court of appeals found in favor of State
Farm, however, on Traver's claims of violation of the Stowers doctrine
and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.6
The Texas Supreme Court began its analysis of the Traver case by em-
phasizing that the key to determining whether a principal is vicariously
responsible for the conduct of an agent is the principal's right to control
the agent with respect to the details of that conduct. 7 While acknowledg-
ing that an insurer typically has the right of "complete and exclusive con-
trol" of the insured's defense, the court held that the defense attorney, as
an independent contractor, is not subject to the carrier's control regard-
ing the day-to-day details of conducting the defense.8 The carrier, under
normal circumstances, has the authority to accept or reject settlement of-
fers and, in the absence of a conflict of interest, make other decisions that
normally lie with the insured/client.9 Noting that an attorney "is in com-
plete charge of the minutiae of court proceedings and can properly with-
draw from the case, subject to the control of the court, if he is not
permitted to act as he thinks best," "' the court held that an insurer cannot
be vicariously liable for a lawyer's conduct, especially where the attorney
is charged with protecting the interest of the insured when the instruc-
tions of the insurer might compromise the insured's interests.'1 In further
dismantling Guin, the Texas Supreme Court reiterated that Guin's broad
language regarding the scope of the insurer's responsibilities was dicta.12
3. See Traver, 980 S.W.2d at 627.




8. See Traver, 980 S.W.2d at 627 (citing Stowers, 15 S.W.2d at 547).
9. See id.
10. Id. at 627-28 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 385, cmt. a).
It. See id. at 628. The Texas Supreme Court relied on a number of other jurisdictions
in arriving at its decision: Ingersoll-Rand Equip. Corp. v. Transportation Ins. Co., 963 F.
Supp. 452, 454-55 (M.D. Pa. 1997) ("The attorney's ethical obligation to his or her client,
the insured, to prevent the insurer from exercising the degree of control necessary to jus-
tify the imposition of vicarious liability."); Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 110 Cal. Rptr. 511,
526 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973) ("In our view independent counsel retained to conduct litigation
in the courts act in the capacity of independent contractors, responsible for the results of
their conduct and not subject to the control and direction of their employer over the details
and manner of their performance."); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Protective Nat'l Ins. Co., 631
So.2d 305, 306-07 (Fla. Ct. App. 1993) (adopting Merritt's reasoning); Feliberty v. Damon,
527 N.E.2d 261, 265 (N.Y. 1988) ("The insurer is precluded from interference with coun-
sel's independent professional judgment in the conduct of the litigation on behalf of its
client."); Brown v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 369 S.E.2d 367, 372 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988),
affd, 390 S.E.2d 150 (1990).
12. See Traver, 980 S.W.2d at 628. In American Physicians Ins. Exch. v. Garcia, 876
S.W.2d 842, 849 (Tex. 1994), the Texas Supreme Court noted that Guin was a Stowers case
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The Traver court specifically rejected any inference that it had held in
Guin that a carrier is vicariously responsible for the conduct of a defense
attorney it appoints for the insured. 13 A liability insurer is not, the court
held, vicariously liable for the conduct of an independent attorney it
selects to defend an insured.14
The Traver court also repudiated State Farm's assertion that Maryland
Insurance Co. v. Head Industrial Coatings & Services, Inc.15 exonerated
State Farm for any breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing in the
context of third-party liability insurance. Noting that the factual circum-
stances of State Farm's alleged conscious undermining of Davidson's de-
fense in the Traver case were "quite different" from the mere refusal of a
defense in Head, the court nonetheless was unable to offer Traver further
relief on appeal since he had failed to challenge the court of appeals'
judgment on the Stowers duty, the duty of good faith and fair dealing, or
any related statutory claims.16
B. USE OF OUTCOME-ORIENTED INVESTIGATION TO DENY CLAIM
In State Farm & Casualty Co. v. Simmons,17 Simmons (insured) bought
a homeowners policy from State Farm. Due to financial difficulties, the
insured arranged a repayment schedule for their mortgage payments with
the Veterans Administration. In that same month, someone burglarized
their home. State Farm paid the insured within a few weeks. Six months
later, the house was destroyed by fire. The insured reported the loss and
the claim was immediately tagged suspicious because of the relatively re-
cent theft claim. Four months later, State Farm denied the insured's fire
claim, and the insured sued State Farm. At trial, the jury found that the
insured had not burned their own home, and that State Farm breached its
duty of good faith and fair dealing and knowingly violated the DTPA,
acting with conscious indifference. The court of appeals affirmed. 18
The Texas Supreme Court first held that evidence supported the find-
ing of a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing by State Farm
because, according to the evidence, State Farm "engaged in an outcome-
oriented investigation designed to place the Simmonses at the center of
only, and that there was no allegation that the carrier was negligent in the investigation or
trial of the underlying suit.
13. In Guin, the court upheld a jury instruction that an attorney retained by an insurer:
is deemed, under the law, to be the sub-agent of the insurance company. As
such, the insurance company is as responsible to the insured for the conduct
of the sub-agent with reference to the litigation as the insurance company is
for its own conduct. Therefore, the insurance company is liable to the in-
sured for damages caused to the insured, if any, by the negligence, if any, of
the sub-agent in conducting the affairs of the insured with reference to the
litigation.
Guin, 723 S.W.2d at 658.
14. See Traver, 980 S.W.2d at 628.
15. 938 S.W.2d 27, 28-29 (Tex. 1996).
16. See Traver, 980 S.W.2d at 629.
17. 963 S.W.2d 42 (Tex. 1998).
18. 857 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993), affd, 963 S.W.2d 42 (Tex. 1998).
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an 'arson triangle."'" 9 First, the fire loss claim was immediately deemed
suspicious despite the fact that the earlier theft was determined to be
legitimate. Next, State Farm failed to investigate other possible suspects.
Because State Farm had testified that revenge and spite are frequent mo-
tives for arson and that it was important to obtain all information with
regard to the claim, the Texas Supreme Court held that the jury could
logically conclude that State Farm's investigation was biased and unrea-
sonable. Moreover, State Farm witnesses described the eight common
indicators of insurance fraud by arson. The first six indicators were undis-
putedly absent. As to the remaining two indicators, evidence showed that
the insured did not remove all furniture or personal items prior to the fire
and that their financial burdens had improved by the time of the fire. The
court also noted that if the insured had actually burned their house, they
would have been homeless with a deficiency owed to their lender because
their mortgage obligation exceeded the policy limits. The court noted
that these facts implied bad faith because State Farm's fundamental
premise of the insured's motive to commit arson lacked credibility. The
insured also testified that State Farm never told them of any discrepancy
between the information they provided and information State Farm ob-
tained. Because State Farm's own witnesses testified that a reasonable
insurer would approach its insureds to resolve such conflicts, the Texas
Supreme Court noted the jury could reasonably conclude State Farm ac-
ted in bad faith. The sum of all evidence presented supported the bad
faith claim.2°
In order to support the punitive damages award against State Farm,
however, the insured had to show that State Farm was "actually aware
that its action would probably result in extraordinary harm not ordinarily
associated with breach of contract or bad faith denial of a claim-such as
death, grievous physical injury or financial ruin."'21 While the insured ar-
gued that State Farm never paid the VA, State Farm countered that it had
contacted the VA and agreed to pay policy limits of $47,000 in exchange
for a lien assignment. The VA, however, never accepted State Farm's
offer. The court held that in light of State Farm's undisputed efforts to
settle with the VA, it could not conclude that State Farm was actually
aware that its actions were likely to result in financial ruin to the insured.
Therefore, the court reversed the punitive damages award against State
Farm. 22
C. SOME INSURANCE EMPLOYEES ARE "PERSONS" UNDER ART. 21.21
In Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Garrison Contractors, Inc.,23 the
court considered the issue of whether an insurance agent employed by an
19. Simmons, 963 S.W.2d at 45.
20. See id. at 47.
21. See id. at 47 (quoting Transportation Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 24 (Tex.
1994)).
22. See id. at 48.
23. 966 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. 1998).
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insurance company is a "person" under Insurance Code article 21.21.24
In 1986, Garrison Contractors asked Garrett, a Liberty employee-agent,
for a quote on general liability, workers' compensation, and auto liability
policies from Liberty. As part of his services to Garrison, Garrett ex-
plained policy provisions and premium calculations. Garrison ultimately
purchased a three-year, multi-line insurance policy with a retrospective
premium plan from Liberty. When the policy period ended, Liberty
billed Garrison for almost $160,000 in retrospective premiums. Garrison
refused to pay and Liberty filed suit to collect the premiums. Garrison
counterclaimed against Liberty and Garrett, alleging that Liberty and
Garrett misrepresented the terms of the retrospective premiums,
breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing, breached fiduciary du-
ties, violated the Texas DTPA and Insurance Code, engaged in fraud and
duress, and was estopped from collecting the alleged retrospective
premiums.
The court of appeals affirmed Liberty's summary judgment,25 disallow-
ing Garrison's common law claims for bad faith and breach of fiduciary
duty. The court, however, reversed the summary judgment on Garrison's
DTPA and Insurance Code claims, finding that Liberty's alleged misrep-
resentation that the retrospective premiums would not exceed ten to fif-
teen percent of the standard premiums could constitute an actionable
misrepresentation under both the DTPA and the Insurance Code. The
court of appeals specifically held that the insured had separate causes of
action against both Liberty and its agent.26
Before the Texas Supreme Court, Liberty and Garrett argued that the
definition of "person" in the Insurance Code only reached business enti-
ties, not the employees of those entities. The court, however, rejected
this construction, noting that the Texas legislature had substituted the
term "person" for the term "company. '27 The court also noted that the
Department of Insurance's position that an insurance company employee
could engage in the business of insurance was unquestionable authority
that such an employee qualified as a "person" under the Insurance
Code. 28 The court cautioned that not every insurance company employee
is a "person" engaged in the business of insurance for purposes of the
Insurance Code, giving examples of a janitor and clerical worker.29 On
the other hand, Garrett clearly established his engagement in the business
of insurance by testifying that his job responsibilities included soliciting
and obtaining insurance policy sales and explaining policy terms and pre-
mium calculations to consumers. Accordingly, the court held that section
16 of article 21.21 provides a cause of action against insurance company
24. See TEX. INS. CODE art. 21.21 § 2(a) (Vernon 1998).
25. See Garrison Contractors, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 927 S.W.2d 296 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1996), affd 966 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. 1998).
26. See id. at 301.
27. Garrison, 966 S.W.2d at 485.
28. Id.
29. See id. at 487.
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employees whose job duties call for them to engage in the business of
insurance. 3 1
D. Loss OF CREDIT REPUTATION MERITS ONLY NOMINAL DAMAGES
In St. Paul Surplus Lines Insurance Co. v. Dal-Worth Tank Co., Inc.,31
Dal-Worth Tank manufactured and sold tanker trucks for transportation
of liquid propane gas. After Mission Butane, one of Dal-Worth's custom-
ers, suffered three rollovers of Dal-Worth tankers, Mission's insurer noti-
fied Dal-Worth of its intent to pursue a subrogation claim against Dal-
Worth and requested that Dal-Worth notify its carrier of a possible design
defect claim. Dal-Worth forwarded the notice and a subsequent DTPA
demand to St. Paul, its products liability carrier. From there, everything
went awry.
After Dal-Worth was served with the suit papers, they were forwarded
to Dal-Worth's insurance agent but apparently were never received by St.
Paul. The St. Paul adjuster assigned to the file repeatedly failed to follow
up on indications that Mission's carrier had filed suit against Dal-Worth.
Almost seven months after Dal-Worth was served, Mission took a default
judgment against Dal-Worth for nearly $800,000 plus attorneys fees. No-
tice of the default judgment was sent to Dal-Worth, but went unheeded.
Later, purely by accident, Mission's subrogation suit was discovered by
an attorney sent by St. Paul's adjuster to the courthouse on another mat-
ter concerning Dal-Worth. Although the St. Paul adjuster discussed hav-
ing the default judgment set aside, no action was taken. Instead, St. Paul
sent the file to coverage counsel to determine if the claims in the default
judgment were covered by the St. Paul policies. Although the St. Paul
adjuster later told Dal-Worth of the default judgment, she failed to in-
form him that St. Paul now questioned coverage in the matter and that St.
Paul had not hired any attorney to defend Dal-Worth's interest in the
default judgment. Even after receiving counsel's coverage opinion, St.
Paul waited a week before denying coverage to Dal-Worth. Although St.
Paul later provided a "courtesy" defense to Dal-Worth in a related per-
sonal injury case, St. Paul refused to post a supersedeas bond to prevent
execution on the writ from the default judgment on Dal-Worth's prop-
erty. As a result, Dal-Worth was forced to file for bankruptcy and later
ceased operations completely.
Among other findings at trial, the jury found that St. Paul breached its
duty of good faith and fair dealing to Dal-Worth. In holding that suffi-
cient evidence supported the jury's finding, the Amarillo Court of Ap-
peals cited St. Paul's denial of coverage four months after the default
judgment was taken and its agents' conduct which led Dal-Worth to be-
lieve that its interests were being represented in the interim.32 The court
also flatly rejected St. Paul's advice-of-counsel defense to the charge that
30. See id.
31. 974 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. 1998).
32. See 917 S.W.2d at 56.
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it wrongfully denied Dal-Worth's defense.33 St. Paul's claim that the
claims made in the default judgment were the basis for its denial of cover-
age was also handily rejected by the court, which noted that the identical
claims were made in a DTPA demand letter sent to Dal-Worth and re-
ceived by St. Paul months before suit was filed by Mission.34 The evi-
dence, the court held, "was sufficient for the jury to believe that St. Paul
lulled Dal-Worth into believing it was handling the matter, and to find
that its later denial of coverage was a breach of its duty of good faith and
fair dealing. '35
In connection with Dal-Worth's "loss of credit reputation" claim, the
Texas Supreme Court noted that, under contract law, to harm a credit
rating merits only nominal damages and compensable damages are not
awarded until a loan is actually denied or a higher interest rate charged. 36
The court noted that although at least one authority did not believe that
this rule applied to tort cases, the court was of the opinion that it
should. 37 Although Dal-Worth had strong credit before filing for bank-
ruptcy and a weaker credit rating afterwards, no evidence was presented
that the decline injured Dal-Worth because Dal-Worth neither needed
nor tried to use its credit. Accordingly, the court reversed the loss of
credit reputation damages.38
The court also reversed the award of additional damages against St.
Paul for "knowing conduct" under the DTPA and Insurance Code.39 The
court noted that in order to sustain such an award, St. Paul must have
acted "knowingly. ' 40 The court explained that although St. Paul did not
do all it could have done to determine if Dal-Worth had been sued, its
conduct constituted only negligence. Therefore, the court reversed the
award of additional damages under the DTPA and Insurance Code be-
cause no evidence supported a knowing violation by St. Paul.41
E. ELECTION OF REMEDY
In Waite Hill Services, Inc. v. World Class Metal Works, Inc.,42 World
Class Metal Works suffered a property loss when one of its nickel-plating
tanks developed a hole. Colony Insurance Company was the carrier for
the property and inland marine of World Class. A Waite Hill claims ex-
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. Id. (citing HOW Ins. Co. v. Patriot Fin. Servs. of Tex., Inc., 786 S.W.2d 533, 541
(Tex. App.-Austin 1990, writ denied), rev'd on other grounds, Hines v. Hash, 843 S.W.2d
464 (Tex. 1992)).
36. See St. Paul Surplus, 974 S.W.2d at 53.
37. See id. at 53 (citing LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1007
(Supp. 1998)).
38. See id.
39. See id. at 54.
40. "Knowingly" means an actual awareness of the falsity, deception or unfairness of
the conduct in question. See id. at 53.
41. See id. at 54.
42. 959 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. 1998).
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aminer denied the claim under the Colony policy. World Class then sued
Colony, Waite Hill, and others for breach of contract, Insurance Code
violations, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and decep-
tive trade practices. The trial court directed a verdict against Colony on
the coverage question and the jury awarded World Class $55,000 in con-
tractual damages. 43 The jury then awarded World Class $55,000 in ex-
tracontractual damages based on Colony's deceptive acts and practices. 44
The extracontractual damages, however, were based on the same ele-
ments of damages as the contractual damages: repair and restoration of
property, lost profits, and replacement of lost solutions.4 5 The trial court
rendered judgment for World Class in the amount of $110,000.46
Before the Texas Supreme Court, Colony contended that the two dam-
age awards constituted a double recovery, requiring World Class to elect
its remedy. The supreme court noted that an objection to the charge was
neither necessary nor proper at trial because a party may sue and seek
damages on alternative theories.4 7 Colony had properly requested,
before judgment, that the trial court require World Class to elect its rem-
edy. Because World Class failed to submit a damages request for distinct
tort losses, the trial court erred when it refused Colony's request that
World Class elect its remedy.48
F. STOWERS LIABILITY FOR ORAL OFFER TO SETTLE
In Trinity Universal Insurance Co. v. Bleeker,49 Bleeker, while under
the influence of alcohol, struck the back of a pick-up truck, killing one
and injuring thirteen others. The medical bills incurred by the injured
parties quickly exceeded Bleeker's personal auto policy 20/40 limits. The
plaintiff's attorney sent Trinity a Stowers demand for the policy limits, but
Trinity failed to inform its insured of the settlement offer. After the set-
tlement offer expired, judgment was entered against Bleeker for damages
exceeding $11 million. The plaintiffs acquired Bleeker's claim against
Trinity and ultimately obtained a $77 million judgment against Trinity.
The court of appeals held that Trinity breached its Stowers duty by fail-
ing to timely respond to an oral settlement offer made by the plaintiffs'
attorney.5(1 The court of appeals also held that the existence of hospital
liens in excess of the policy limits does not excuse a carrier from the duty
imposed by Stowers to respond as a reasonably prudent person.5 1 Before
the Texas Supreme Court, however, the issue of whether an oral offer to




47. See id. at 184 (citing Birchfield v. Texarkana Mem. Hosp., 747 S.W.2d 361, 367
(Tex. 1987)).
48. See id. at 185 (citing Kish v. Van Note, 692 S.W.2d 463, 466-67 (Tex. 1985)).
49. 966 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1998).




settle is adequate under Stowers was not decided. Instead, the court held
that Trinity never had a duty to settle because none of the settlement
offers proposed by the plaintiff's attorney included or mentioned the hos-
pitals liens that existed. 52 The court held that any implied release of the
hospital liens did not comply with Texas Property Code §57.000(a), which
states the requirements for a valid release of a hospital lien.53
The supreme court also considered whether Trinity's failure to inform
Bleeker or his attorney of the plaintiff's oral settlement offer was uncon-
scionable conduct under the DTPA. The court noted that Bleeker could
not recover under the DTPA unless he proved that Trinity's conduct was
a "producing cause" of his damages.54 Trinity claimed that its failure to
inform Bleeker and his attorney of the settlement offers was not a pro-
ducing cause of Bleeker's damages because Bleeker produced no evi-
dence that either he or his attorney would have been inclined to meet the
demand. Because there was no evidence of Bleeker's propensity to ac-
cept the offers, the Texas Supreme Court did not consider Trinity's argu-
ment that Bleeker could not state a claim under the DTPA. The court
rendered a take-nothing judgment against Bleeker.55
G. BIFURCATED SETTLEMENT OFFER DOES NOT SATISFY STOWERS
In State Farm Lloyds Insurance Co. v. Maldonado,56 Maldonado sued
Robert for defamation. Robert was insured by State Farm under a policy
covering up to $300,000 in personal injury damages. The policy prohib-
ited Robert from settling any claim against him without State Farm's per-
mission. Maldonado made a total demand of $1.3 million: $1 million
from Robert and $300,000 from State Farm. Once the deadline passed
without State Farm's acceptance to Maldonado's offer, Robert entered an
agreement to pay Maldonado $1 million from his own pocket. Maldo-
nado agreed not to execute against any of Robert's personal assets except
for insurance policies. Robert and Maldonado further agreed that Rob-
ert would be reimbursed $1 million from any recovery against State Farm,
and the two would split any remaining amount evenly.
The parties proceeded to trial on the defamation claim. Robert did not
appear or offer any evidence. The court rendered judgment in favor of
52. See Bleeker, 966 S.W.2d at 491.
53. See id. When a hospital lien exists, a release is not valid unless:
(1) the hospital's charges were paid in full before the execution and delivery
of the release;
(2) the hospital's charges were paid before the execution and delivery of the
release to the extent of any full and true consideration paid to the in-
jured individual by or on behalf of the other parties to the release; or
(3) the hospital is a party to the release.
TEX. PROP. CODE § 55.007 (a) (Vernon 1998).
54. See Bleeker, 966 S.W.2d at 491 (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE § 17.50 (a); Doe v.
Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 481 (Tex. 1995)).
55. See id. at 492.
56. 963 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. 1998).
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Maldonado for $2 million in damages.57 Maldonado and Robert then
brought suit against State Farm. The trial court awarded both contractual
and extracontractual damages to Maldonado and Robert.58 The court of
appeals affirmed the award of contractual damages for Maldonado and
the award of extracontractual damages for Robert based on State Farm's
failure to settle, but reversed the award of extracontractual damages
based on breach of good faith and fair dealing and on article 21.21
violations.59
Before the Texas Supreme Court, State Farm contended that there was
no evidence to support a payment under its policy. The court agreed and
noted that the defamation trial violated the "actual trial" condition of the
policy.61) Although Maldonado appeared and presented evidence at trial,
Robert did not. Because there was no real contest on the issues, the
supreme court held that the judgment was collusive and that Maldonado
was not entitled as a third-party beneficiary to collect under the policy.61
The Texas Supreme Court also considered whether Robert had a valid
Stowers claim. State Farm contended that Maldonado never made a set-
tlement demand within the $300,000 policy limits of Robert's policy.
There was no dispute that Maldonado never made a settlement demand
of less than $1.3 million. Maldonado claimed, however, that Robert's of-
fer to pay $1 million converted the $1.3 million demand into a $300,000
policy limits demand. The supreme court rejected this argument stating
that there was no evidence to support Maldonado's claim that all the par-
ties understood that the $1.3 million settlement offer was bifurcated: $1
million from Robert and $300,000 from State Farm. 62 In addition, the
supreme court remarked that there was no evidence to indicate that State
Farm knew, at a point when it had a reasonable amount of time to re-
spond, that Robert had made an unconditional offer to pay the excess. 63
Based on these facts, the court concluded that the demand was not an
unconditional offer to settle within policy limits and, therefore, did not
trigger the Stowers doctrine. 64
II. CLAIMS HANDLING
A. DUTY TO INDEMNIFY MAY BE RESOLVED BY
DECLARATORY ACTION
In Farmers Texas County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Griffin,65 Griffin was
shot in a drive-by shooting. Griffin sued Royal, the car's driver, and
others for negligence and gross negligence. Royal had an automobile
57. See id. at 39.
58. See id. at 39-40.
59. See id. at 40.
60. See id. at 41.
61. See id. at 40.
62. See id. at 41.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. 955 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. 1997).
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policy with Farmers. Farmers initially defended Royal under a reserva-
tion of rights, but sought a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to
indemnify or defend Royal. Although the trial court found in favor of
Farmers, the court of appeals reversed in part, holding that Farmers had a
duty to defend Royal, even if it did not have a duty to indemnify him.
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that
Farmers had no duty to defend or indemnify Royal. 66 Although Griffin's
petition alleged legal theories of negligence and gross negligence, an in-
surer's duty to defend is determined by examining the petition's factual
allegations and the policy's language. 67 The factual allegations in the pe-
tition stated that Griffin's injuries were the result of "a random act of
violence," intentional conduct which was excluded under the policy.68
Accordingly, Farmers had no duty to defend Royal in the Griffin action.
In addition, the court held that Farmers had no duty to defend because
the policy covered only injuries resulting from an "auto accident. '69
Since the Griffin petition failed to allege injuries caused by an "auto acci-
dent," Farmers' duty to defend Royal was not triggered.70
But the significant issue decided by Griffin concerned the carrier's abil-
ity to obtain a declaratory judgment on the issue of its duty to indemnify
the insured prior to the resolution of the underlying suit. In Fireman's
Insurance Co. v. Burch,71 the Texas Supreme Court held that no justicia-
ble controversy exists regarding an insurer's duty to indemnify before a
judgment has been rendered against the insured. At the time Burch was
decided, the Texas Constitution gave district courts original jurisdiction in
cases where the matter in controversy was at least $500. Since Burch,
Texas Constitution article V, section 8 was amended to create original
jurisdiction in the district courts over "all actions, proceedings and reme-
dies."' 72 The Texas Supreme Court held that this "significantly broad-
ened" the scope of district court jurisdiction to allow the courts to resolve
declaratory judgment actions on the duty to indemnify.73 The supreme
court noted that not every coverage case may be properly decided prior
to resolution of the underlying suit. The court held, however, that the
duty to indemnify is justiciable prior to a judgment against the insured
when the insurer has no duty to defend and the same reasons that negate
a duty to defend will also operate to nullify any possibility that the insurer
will ever have a duty to indemnify. 74 Based on that pronouncement, the
court held that Farmers had no duty to indemnify Royal.
66. See id. at 82.
67. See id. (citing National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Merchants Fast Motor Lines, Inc.,
939 S.W.2d 139 (Tex. 1997)).
68. Id. at 82.
69. See id. at 83.
70. See id.
71. 442 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. 1968).





B. WITHDRAWAL FROM DEFENSE UNDER RESERVATION OF RIGHTS
In Katerndahl v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,75 the court held that
an insured must prove harm or prejudice resulted from a carrier's with-
drawal from defense where a valid reservation of rights was in place in
order to estop the carrier from denying coverage. 76 In 1991, Dr.
Katerndahl filed for divorce against his wife, who then counterclaimed
against him for prescribing addictive medicines and causing her emo-
tional distress. After he turned the suit over to his homeowners carrier,
State Farm initially defended Dr. Katerndahl under a reservation of
rights. During mediation, however, State Farm concluded that Mrs.
Katerndahl's allegations against Dr. Katerndahl did not qualify for cover-
age because of the professional services, business pursuits, and inten-
tional injury exclusions. Since all of Mrs. Katerndahl's claims against her
husband involved either intentional acts of cruelty or actions taken by Dr.
Katerndahl in his role as a physician, the court found that, as a matter of
law, State Farm owed no duty to defend Dr. Katerndahl against Mrs.
Katerndahl's allegations. 77
The court concluded that because State Farm had a valid reservation of
rights, the carrier was legally able to withdraw its defense when it became
clear that it was not obligated to offer such a defense under the policy.78
The Katerndahls contended, however, that State Farm waived its right to
withdraw from the defense because the reservation of rights letter did not
specify that State Farm could withdraw the defense prior to a verdict.
The court rejected this claim, maintaining that a reservation of rights per-
mits the insurer the opportunity to research questions of liability, and in
most instances there is "no way to determine the exact point in time that
those questions will be resolved."' 79 In response to the Katerndahls' es-
toppel argument based on a State Farm agent's representation that State
Farm would defend Dr. Katerndahl to a verdict, the court held that the
insured must produce evidence that he was clearly harmed by the in-
surer's actions, regardless of whether the insured relied upon waiver or
estoppel to challenge the carrier's coverage defense. 80 In order to pre-
vail, Dr. Katerndahl had to show that he detrimentally relied on the
agent's statement. Instead, the court found that Dr. Katerndahl behaved
exactly the same before and after the agent's statement; specifically, he
participated in the defense of his case with his attorney of choice. 81 The
only harm alleged by the Katerndahls was that they were abandoned dur-
75. 961 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, no pet.).
76. See id. at 524.
77. See id. at 522.
78. See id.
79. Id. at 523 (citing State Farm Lloyds, Inc. v. Williams, 791 S.W.2d 542, 550 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied)).
80. See id. at 524 (citing Paradigm Ins. Co. v. Texas Richmond Corp., 942 S.W.2d 645,
652-53 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1997, writ denied); State Farm Lloyds, Inc. v. Wil-
liams, 791 S.W.2d 542, 552-53 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied); Pennsylvania Nat'l




ing the mediation of the lawsuit shortly before the trial date. Accord-
ingly, the court affirmed the trial court's summary judgment for State
Farm.8 2
C. RIGHT TO REIMBURSEMENT FOR DEFENSE AND
SETTLEMENT COSTS
In Matagorda County v. Texas Association of Counties County Govern-
ment Risk Management Pool,83 Matagorda County and its sheriff were
covered under a TAC law enforcement liability policy. Beginning in 1991,
an exclusion for liability arising out of the county's jail was included in
the policy. In 1993, three county jail prisoners sued the County and the
sheriff for sexual assaults that occurred in the jail. TAC provided a de-
fense to the County and the sheriff under a reservation of rights and filed
a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination of no coverage on
account of the jail exclusion. During the fall of 1995, TAC informed the
County that it had received and intended to accept a settlement offer of
$300,000 in the underlying matter. TAC also told the County that it
would seek reimbursement of the full settlement amount if the declara-
tory judgment action was determined in TAC's favor. TAC settled the
underlying lawsuit a few months later. TAC then amended the declara-
tory judgment suit to request reimbursement of both settlement and de-
fense costs incurred by TAC in the underlying action. TAC ultimately
prevailed on its declaratory action, obtaining a determination of no cov-
erage and judgment for $300,000 in settlement costs and more than
$53,000 in defense costs expended in the underlying action. 84
On appeal, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals considered recent pre-
cedent for the recovery of defense costs expended on behalf of an in-
sured. Following Buss v. Superior Court,85 the court held that
reimbursement of defense costs is not allowed when the reservation of
rights letter is silent and there is no agreement or understanding that the
insured would reimburse if it was later determined there was no duty to
defend.86 The court applied Texas law on quasi-contract, unjust enrich-
ment and quantum meruit to determine that an insurer must provide
"specific notice" of its intent to seek reimbursement for defense costs in
its reservation of rights letter to the insured.8 7 With respect to the reser-
vation of rights letter sent to the County, the court held that although the
82. See id.
83. 975 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, pet. filed).
84. See id. at 784.
85. 16 Cal. 4th 35, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 366, 939 P.2d 766, 776-78, 784 n.27 (1997).
86. See Matagorda County, 975 S.W.2d at 784 (citing Michaelian v. State Compensa-
tion Ins. Fund, 50 Cal. App. 4th 1093, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 133, 144 n.8 (1996); In re Hansel, 160
B.R. 66, 70 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1993) (applying Texas law); Terra Nova Ins. Co. v. 900 Bar,
Inc., 887 F.2d 1213, 1219-20 (3d Cir. 1989) (concluding generally under Pennsylvania law
that even when the insurer defends under a reservation of rights letter, it may not later
recover costs expended in defending the insured, on the ground that the insurer's provision
of a defense is as much for its own benefit as for the insured's)).
87. See id. at 785.
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letter encouraged the County to consult with attorneys about coverage
issues, there was no suggestion that TAC would try to recover any de-
fense costs if it obtained a finding of no coverage in the declaratory judg-
ment action. 88 Because TAC failed to specifically reserve the right to
recoup defense costs, the County was not liable for them.89
The court also found that quantum meruit and unjust enrichment theo-
ries do not apply to an insurer's settlement with a claimant which by-
passes the insured and does not require the insured's acceptance or
approval. 90 TAC argued that it was equitably subrogated to the rights of
the underlying claimants once it settled the claims. The court rejected
this position because principles of subrogation do not apply to a "mere
stranger or volunteer who has paid the debt of another, without assign-
ment or agreement for subrogation, without being under any legal obliga-
tion to make payment, and without being compelled to do so for the
preservation of any rights or property of his own." 91 The court held that
an insurer has no right to reimbursement for settlement amounts absent
the insured's specific agreement to be bound by the insurer's settlement
and to allow reimbursement to the insurer if coverage is subsequently
determined in the carrier's favor.92 Even though TAC communicated its
intention to seek reimbursement for the settlement costs, there was no
evidence indicating the County agreed to the settlement or agreed that
TAC could later seek reimbursement. As a result, TAC was denied re-
covery for the amount of the settlement.93
III. LIABILITY
A. OCCURRENCE AND ACCIDENT
In Freedman v. Cigna Insurance Co. of Texas,94 the Marxes bought a
house from the Freedmans. After various problems with the roof oc-
curred, the Marxes learned that the Freedmans failed to disclose that the
roof required repairs during the Freedmans' residence. The Marxes sued
the Freedmans for violations of the Texas DTPA, common law fraud,
fraud in a real estate transaction, and negligence. Cigna and ICNA re-
fused the Freedmans' request for a defense under their policies because,
among other things, there was no "occurrence." The court of appeals
noted that the event for which the Marxes sued the Freedmans was the
Freedmans' misrepresentations, about the condition of the roof, not the
actual collapse of the roof. The court of appeals, affirming the trial court,




91. Id. at 786 (citing First Nat'l Bank of Kerrville v. O'Dell, 856 S.W.2d 410,415 (Tex.
1993) (citing Oury v. Saunders, 77 Tex. 278, 280, 13 S.W. 1030, 1031 (1890)).
92. See id. at 787.
93. See id.
94. 976 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1998, no pet.).
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do not fall within the definition of "occurrence. ' 95 The court also re-
jected the Freedmans' contention that the Marxes' alternative theories of
negligence brought the claim within the coverage of the policies.96 Not-
ing that the mere allegation of negligence does not control the duty to
defend, the court held that all of the facts alleged by the Marxes pointed
to intentional conduct by the Freedmans in concealing the condition of
the roof.97 Cigna and ICNA were held to have no duty to defend the
Freedmans.
In Wessinger v. Fire Insurance Exchange,98 an intoxicated Wessinger
punched Morrison several times, causing permanent disfigurement to
Morrison's face. Morrison successfully sued Wessinger and was awarded
$127,000 in damages. Wessinger's homeowners carrier, FIE, filed a de-
claratory judgment action to challenge coverage for the underlying inci-
dent. The appellate court determined that the policy's exclusion for
intentional acts included Wessinger's inebriated attack on Morrison. The
court examined the policy and construed the term "accident" (which was
not defined in the policy) in accordance with the definition provided in
Argonaut Southwest Insurance Co. v. Maupin.99 Using the Maupin anal-
ysis, the Wessinger court determined that the act was both voluntary and
intentional, falling outside the definition of "accident." 100 The court then
decided whether the resultant injuries were a natural result of the act.
Under Texas law, the natural result of an act is the result that ordinarily
follows, may be reasonably anticipated, and ought to be expected. 01 The
court determined that whether Wessinger intended or anticipated Morri-
son's injuries was not the deciding factor, but rather whether Morrison's
injuries were quite simply the likely and natural result of Wessinger strik-
ing Morrison in the face. 102 The court held that voluntary intoxication
was no excuse and did not render Wessinger's actions unintentional. 103
Accordingly, the court of appeals held that FIE did not breach its con-
tract or violate either the DTPA or the Insurance Code when it refused to
defend or indemnify Wessinger. 10 4
B. NUMBER OF OCCURRENCES
In H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co.,10 5 a
grocery store employee sexually molested two children. Although the as-
95. See id. at 778 (citing Houston Petroleum Co. v. Highlands Ins. Co., 830 S.W.2d 153,
156 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied)); see also State Farm Lloyds v.
Kessler, 932 S.W.2d, 738 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, writ denied) (misrepresentations
and failures to disclose are intentional acts, not accidents).
96. See id. at 778-79.
97. See id. at 779.
98. 949 S.W.2d 834 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, no writ).
99. 500 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. 1973).
100. See Wessinger, 949 S.W.2d at 838.




105. 150 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 1998).
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saults occurred at the same restroom of the store, they occurred about a
week apart. The children's families sued the store for negligence, alleging
that H.E. Butt Grocery (HEB) knew the employee had assaulted another
child at another store in the past and that HEB's only response had been
to transfer the employee to a new store. HEB settled with the families
for $1 million each. HEB then made a claim under its general liability
policy with National Union. Under the terms of the policy, HEB was its
own primary insurer with a self-insured retention of $1 million per occur-
rence. Once HEB satisfied its self-insured retention, National Union was
responsible for the remaining damages. A dispute arose between the in-
sured and the carrier as to whether the two sexual assaults arose from a
single occurrence. Although HEB contended that the term occurrence 106
was ambiguous, the district court granted summary judgment for Na-
tional Union."07 In affirming the summary judgment for National Union,
the Fifth Circuit rejected HEB's argument that the cause of the children's
injuries was the negligent supervision of the employee. Adopting a cause
and effect analysis, the court reasoned that it was the act of molestation
by the employee, rather than the employer's negligent supervision which
resulted in the children's injuries. 10 8 The Fifth Circuit stated that it was
bound by Texas law and the policy language to look at the independent
events which gave rise to the insured's liability and caused the injuries,
rather than the number of injuries or the number of victims.109 The court
specifically noted that HEB's advocacy of the single occurrence argument
was short-sighted since the best interpretation of "occurrence" for the
insured in this case "will not necessarily be the interpretation favorable to
the insured in the next case." 110
In Foust v. Ranger Insurance Co.," 1 Walters Farms retained Lindeman
to crop dust its milo crop with herbicide. During the one-day application,
some of the herbicide drifted from the target area onto tracts of land
farmed by the McDaniels, causing extensive damage to the McDaniels'
cotton crop and greatly reducing the cotton yield. The McDaniels sued
Lindeman, Walters Farms and the herbicide manufacturer for loss of in-
come they suffered as a result of the crop damage. Lindeman alerted
Ranger, the carrier for his aircraft insurance that covered claims resulting
from aerial application of chemicals. The limits of liability under the pol-
icy were $100,000 per occurrence and $200,000 per policy period. After
dispute concerning the number of occurrences arose during settlement
106. The policy's definition of "occurrence" read "an event, including continuous or
repeated exposure to conditions, which result[s] in Personal Injury or Property Damage
during the policy period, neither expected or intended from the standpoint of the Insured.
All Personal Injury or Property Damage arising out of the continuous or repeated expo-
sure to substantially the same general conditions shall be considered as arising out of one
occurrence." Id. at 529.
107. See id. at 528.
108. See id. at 530-34.
109. See id. at 535.
110. Id. at 534.
111. 975 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied).
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negotiations between the McDaniels and Ranger, Ranger filed a declara-
tory judgment action. The trial court determined that the application of
the herbicide amounted to a single occurrence. 112
On appeal, the court first considered the McDaniels' argument that the
trial court had no jurisdiction in the case because its judgment effectively
establishing Ranger's indemnity liability under the policy was based upon
a hypothetical and was purely advisory in nature in contravention of Fire-
men's Insurance Co. of Newark v. Burch.1" 3 The court of appeals focused
on the wording of the judgment and found that the judgment, while recit-
ing the limits of liability found in the policy, did not actually state that
Ranger had to pay the limits of the policy. 1 4 Therefore, because the
judgment was rendered only on the duty to defend, the trial court was not
in violation of Burch.115
The Foust court then turned to the question of the number of occur-
rences.116 The McDaniels argued that the damages resulted from multi-
ple occurrences because the conditions during the application process
were constantly changing. Specifically, the McDaniels contended that be-
cause the plane landed and was reloaded with herbicide several times
during the three-hour spraying process, each return to the sky created a
new cloud of damaging herbicide and a separate condition. On the other
hand, Ranger contended that the damage to the McDaniels' cotton crop
resulted from the same general conditions and, therefore, was caused by
one occurrence. The court distinguished State Farm Lloyds, Inc. v. Wil-
liams,117 in which the court held that injuries resulting from separate gun-
shots were caused by multiple occurrences, on the basis that the policy in
the Williams case contained no definition of "occurrence." ' 18 Instead,
citing cases which relied on the "same general conditions" language of
the "occurrence" definition, the court held that the application process
was a single procedure, despite the fact that it required several passes
over various tracts of land, and that this single procedure as a whole was
the cause of the damage to the McDaniels' cotton crop.119
C. TRIGGER OF COVERAGE
In American Home Assurance Co. v. Unitramp Ltd.,12O the Fifth Circuit
112. See id. at 330.
113. See 442 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Tex. 1968).
114. See id.
115. See id.; see also Griffin, 955 S.W.2d at 84 (discussed at nn.35-40, supra).
116. The Ranger policy issued to Lindeman defined "occurrence" as:
a sudden event or repeated exposure to conditions involving aircraft during
the policy period, neither expected or intended by [the insured], that causes
bodily injury or property damage to others during the policy period. All
bodily injury or property damage resulting from the same general conditions
will be considered to be caused by one occurrence.
975 S.W.2d at 333.
117. 960 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, writ dism'd by agr.).
118. See id. at 783.
119. See Foust, 975 S.W.2d at 334.
120. 146 F.3d 311 (5th Cir. 1998).
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forayed into the treacherous territory of trigger of coverage under a lia-
bility policy. Unitramp chartered a cargo vessel and purchased fuel from
Enjet Refining. The fuel was delivered by Enjet from its Engleside facil-
ity and loaded onto the ship in Corpus Christi. At the time of loading,
Unitramp sent a sample of the fuel for testing by a commercial labora-
tory. After the ship departed for Casablanca, Unitramp learned from the
laboratory that the fuel contained an excessive amount of water. As a
result, the ship was forced to divert to Florida to exchange fuel before
continuing to Casablanca. Unitramp sued Enjet for losses caused by the
delay. Enjet ultimately settled with Unitramp for $210,000 while Enjet
was in bankruptcy. Enjet's carrier, American Home, filed a declaratory
judgment action against Unitramp, asserting that no indemnification cov-
erage existed because the Engleside facility was not a scheduled location
at the time the fuel was loaded. The facts revealed that several days after
the fuel was loaded and two days before Unitramp discovered the fuel
was contaminated, the Enjet policy was renewed and the Engleside facil-
ity added as a scheduled location. The trial court initially agreed with the
carrier that, for purposes of insurance coverage, the "occurrence" hap-
pened when the contaminated fuel was loaded onto the cargo ship. On
appeal, the Fifth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case for
a determination of when Unitramp sustained actual damage. 12' After de-
termining that Unitramp sustained actual damage on the date the fuel
was loaded, the trial court again entered judgment for Unitramp.
The Fifth Circuit noted that under Texas law, the time of an "occur-
rence" is when the injured party was actually damaged, not when the
wrongful act was committed. 122 The court cited Cullen/Frost Bank of
Dallas, N.A. v. Commonwealth Lloyd's Insurance Co., 23 which held that
"coverage is not afforded unless an identifiable damage or injury, other
than merely causative negligence, takes place during the policy pe-
riod. '' 124 Relying on the authority of Cullen/Frost Bank, the Fifth Circuit
rejected American Home's attempt to extend the word "identifiable" to
mean "capable of being known by testing" since such a holding would
encumber insureds such as Unitramp with an "unprecedented duty to
conduct limitless tests and inspections for hidden defects. '125 The court
emphasized that insureds were not assigned constructive knowledge of all
defects that are capable of being uncovered through testing. Instead, the
Fifth Circuit reiterated that under Texas law the date of an "occurrence"
under a liability policy is when the damage is capable of being easily per-
ceived, recognized, and understood. 126 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit
121. See American Home Assurance Co. v. Unitramp Ltd., 91 F.3d 141 (5th Cir. 1996)
(per curiam) (unpublished).
122. See American Home Assurance Co. v. Unitramp, Ltd., 146 F.3d 311, 313 (5th Cir.
1998).
123. 852 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993), order granting writ withdrawn, 889
S.W.2d 226 (Tex. 1994).
124. Id. at 257.
125. Unitramp, 146 F.3d at 314.
126. See id. at 314.
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held that Unitramp sustained no damage until it learned of the contami-
nation from the lab results. 127
D. POLLUTION EXCLUSION
The Fifth Circuit was active during the last year concerning application
of the pollution exclusion. 128 In Guaranty National Insurance Co. v. Vic
Manufacturing Co.,129 Pilgrim Enterprises purchased from Vic, a manu-
facturer, dry cleaning equipment which contaminated Pilgrim's property
and adjoining property with perchloretylene (perc), a toxic chemical. Pil-
grim and adjoining homeowners sued Vic and other dry cleaning equip-
ment manufacturers to recover cleanup costs. Vic subsequently made
claims on liability policies issued by Guaranty for the relevant period.
The policies contained a limited pollution exclusion. 130 The district court
held that the Pilgrim suit did not allege damages within the "sudden and
accidental" exception to the pollution exclusion and that Guaranty had
no duty to defend Vic.
At the outset, the Fifth Circuit noted that the "sudden and accidental"
clause contains a temporal element in additional to the requirement of
being unforeseen or unexpected' 3' citing Mustang Tractor & Equipment
v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.1 32 The court then examined the underly-
ing pleadings for its analysis of the duty to defend. The court noted that
although the underlying pleadings at one point alternatively alleged that
the design of the equipment would result in "sudden and accidental" dis-
charges of perc, the overall theme of the pleadings was that the pollution
occurred and was designed to occur "in the regular course of the dry
cleaning business."'1 33 The court specifically rejected Vic's attempt to
"microanalyze" the case and create a duty to defend by pointing out a
single spill (out of almost eighty) that may have been "sudden and acci-
dental."'1 34 The Fifth Circuit held that "regardless of the catch phrases
used in the petition, the pollution is not 'sudden and accidental' when it
consists of repeated, regular discharges over numerous years in the usual
127. See id.
128. See also Lubbock County Hosp. Dist. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pitts-
burgh, Pa., 143 F.3d 239 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding pollution exclusion excluded coverage
under aircraft liability policy for cleanup and monitoring costs associated with spill of fuel
from hospital helipad); Snydergeneral Corp. v. Continental Ins. Co., 133 F.3d 373 (5th Cir.
1998) (discharge of trichloroethylene from dry wells used to drain the chemical from the
insured's California manufacturing plant was not "accidental" under either Texas or Min-
nesota law as provided under "sudden and accidental" exception to pollution exclusion).
129. 143 F.3d 192 (5th Cir. 1998).
130. The limited pollution exclusion stated that the policy did not provide coverage for
"bodily injury or property damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape
of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materi-
als or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any
water course or body of water; but this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, disper-
sal, release or escape is sudden and accidental." Id. at 193.
131. See id. at 194.
132. See 76 F.3d 89, 91 (5th Cir. 1996).
133. Vic Mfg., 143 F.3d at 194.
134. Id. at 195.
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course of business operation."' 35 Interestingly, because Guaranty had
stipulated at trial that a determination of its duty to indemnify Vic was
premature, the Fifth Circuit was unable to reach the issue of
indemnification.
In Allen v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 13 6 the Aliens won a
suit against Tawakoni, their water utility company, for its failure to pro-
vide potable water. St. Paul, Tawakoni's CGL carrier, refused to defend
because pollution exclusions in the policies applied to the Allen suit's al-
legations that the water was contaminated. Tawakoni assigned its claim
against St. Paul for wrongful refusal to defend to the Aliens in return for
a covenant not to execute. After the Aliens sued St. Paul, the trial court
granted summary judgment for St. Paul. On appeal, the Aliens con-
tended that St. Paul failed to establish that the pollution exclusions cov-
ered all of the Aliens' claims. The plaintiffs argued that, while their
claims based on contamination were appropriately excluded by the pollu-
tion exclusions, their other claims concerning Tawakoni's water (that it
was "not potable," not of "good quality" and "not reasonably fit for resi-
dential use") should not have been excluded. The Aliens argued that
water could have a variety of conditions rendering it non-potable, without
the water containing pollutants. The court responded that the Aliens did
not allege facts separate from contamination, and because "contami-
nants" were absolutely excluded, all of the Aliens' claims were rightfully
excluded.137 The court further ruled that St. Paul also had no duty to
indemnify Tawakoni for the Allen judgment based on the pollution
exclusions.138
In E & L Chipping Co., Inc. v. Hanover Insurance Co.,13 9 the insured
sued its CGL carriers, St. Paul and Hanover, for refusing to defend four
lawsuits over run-off water contaminated by the insured's efforts to extin-
guish a fire on its property in late 1988. In addition to breach of contract,
E&L sued the carriers for fraud, misrepresentation, negligence, breach of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and violations of DTPA. The St.
Paul policy covered "property damage" occurring in the policy period.
Although the fire occurred prior to St. Paul's coverage, the court found
the resultant run-off contaminated lakes and underground water systems
and four properties throughout St. Paul's policy period, and caused prop-
erty damage under the policy. 140 St. Paul argued that the claims fell
within the policy exclusion for "expected or intended" property damage.
While the insured intended to extinguish the fire (which caused the con-
taminated run-off), the court rejected St. Paul's arguments that there was
no accident, and that the expected and intended injury exclusion ap-
135. Id.
136. 960 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1998, no pet.).
137. See id. at 912.
138. See id. at 913.
139. 962 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1998, no pet.).
140. See id. at 275.
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plied.141 This interpretation, the court reasoned, would render insurance
coverage illusory for many of the things for which insured commonly
purchase insurance. 142 St. Paul also contended that the underlying claims
were not covered because they were "known losses" or "losses in pro-
gress"'143 prior to the inception of the St. Paul policy. The court found
that the pleadings alleged property damage during the policy period. 144
The court also found no evidence of E&L's intent to deceive St. Paul on
St. Paul's claim that E&L made misrepresentations on its insurance appli-
cation by failing to list claims regarding the fire water run-off.145 The
appellate court found that the trial court erred in granting St. Paul's sum-
mary judgment, and reversed and remanded the case against St. Paul for
trial.146
The Hanover policy contained an "absolute pollution exclusion" up-
held as unambiguous by the Texas Supreme Court in National Union Fire
Insurance Co. v. CBI Industries, Inc.147 E&L contended that ground-
water, one of the alleged causes of damage, was not "pollution" and,
therefore was not excluded by the "pollution exclusion." E&L also as-
serted that the damage fell within the "hostile fire" exception to the pol-
lution exclusion. In response to both claims, the court held that the
damages resulted from contamination of the groundwater, not from fire
or smoke. 148 The court held that the absolute pollution exclusion in the
Hanover policies applied.' 49 In addition, there was no dispute that E&L
failed to timely notify Hanover of three pending lawsuits. E&L con-
tended that Hanover waived the policy's notice requirement since it had
already denied coverage of another claim arising out of the fire. The
court held that because E&L never timely notified Hanover of the three
suits, the duty to defend was never triggered.'50 Consequently, the court
ruled that E&L could not recover the costs of defending the three law-
suits, and affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Hanover.151
E. PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY EXCLUSION
In Atlantic Lloyd's Insurance Co. of Texas v. Susman Godfrey,
L.L.P.,152 the law firm of Susman Godfrey represented a woman in a
medical negligence suit against Dr. Likover. The settlement agreement in
the suit against Likover contained a confidentiality agreement. After the
141. See id. at 275-76.
142. See id. at 276.
143. For a discussion of the known loss and loss in progress doctrines, see Two Pesos,
Inc. v. Gulf Ins. Co., 901 S.W.2d 495, 501 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ).
144. Id. at 275. E&L Chipping Co., 962 S.W.2d at 275.
145. See id. at 276.
146. See id.
147. 907 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. 1995).
148. See E&L Chipping Co., 962 S.W.2d at 277-78.
149. See id. at 278.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. 982 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. App. - Dallas 1998, no pet.).
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suit was settled, one of the firm's attorneys sent a letter informing a for-
mer patient of Dr. Likover about the lawsuit. The letter invited the for-
mer patient to contact the firm to discuss any concerns the patient had
about Dr. Likover's treatment or any questions the patient had about
filing a lawsuit against Dr. Likover. Dr. Likover sued the firm for defa-
mation after he learned of the solicitation letter. The firm tendered the
Likover suit to Atlantic Lloyd's for a defense under its general liability
policy. Atlantic filed a declaratory judgment action claiming that the pol-
icy did not cover the underlying defamation or, alternatively, the policy's
exclusion for professional services applied to the claim. The trial court
granted summary judgment for the firm and Atlantic appealed.
The Dallas Court of Appeals rejected Atlantic's argument that Dr.
Likover's defamation claim did not constitute an "advertising injury"
under the policy.153 The policy's definition of "advertising injury" in-
cluded an injury arising from a written publication which slanders a per-
son. The court determined that the purpose of the firm's letter to Dr.
Likover's former patient was to "cast Likover in an unfavorable light to
encourage a lawsuit against Likover. '' 154 In addition, the letter's claims
regarding its previous successful suits against the doctor were "to gain the
business" of the doctor's former patients, the court held.155 Accordingly,
the court held that Dr. Likover's claim stated an "advertising injury"
within the definition of the Atlantic policy.' 56 The court then rejected
Atlantic's claim that the policy's professional services exclusion applied
to the claim.1 57 Atlantic asserted that "professional services" included
acts that are integral to the practice of law, such as the solicitation of
clients. The firm, on the other hand, contended that the solicitation letter
merely created the opportunity to provide professional services for
others, but did not constitute the rendering of legal services or the prac-
tice of law. The court agreed, stating that an act is not a professional
service simply because it is performed by a professional. Instead, the
court held that a professional service must require the professional to use
his specialized knowledge or training. 158 The court explicitly rejected At-
lantic Lloyd's argument that the strict regulation of attorney solicitation
changed the subject "into a matter inherent to the profession. 1 59 Atlan-
153. See id. at 475-76.
154. Id. at 475.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 475-76.
157. The professional services exclusion in the policy excluded coverage for "advertis-
ing injury," among other things, "due to the rendering or failure to render any professional
services." The exclusion defined "professional services" as:
Legal services included but not limited to counseling, advice, or any other
services regardless of where, how, and by whom provided which may be or
are provided or rendered by lawyers, paralegals and others working in a law
office and/or administration, management or other services arising out of or
in any way connected with the legal services described herein.
Id. at 476.
158. See id. at 478.
159. Id. at 477.
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tic Lloyd's also contended that the solicitation letter indicated that the
firm had evaluated the situation, concluded that an injury was caused by
medical negligence, discussed the prior settlement, and expressed its in-
terest in filing suit on behalf of the patient. The court of appeals refused
to adopt Atlantic Lloyd's characterization of the situation, holding that
none of the opinions or language in the letter provided legal services and
no legal opinion was expressed about the patient's individual case.160 The
court concluded that Susman, Godfrey had "merely engaged in a practice
designed to acquire new business" a practice which did not rise to the
level of rendering professional legal services. 161 Distinguishing an attor-
ney's daily professional functions of advising clients, drafting pleadings,
analyzing case law and forming trial strategy, the court of appeals specifi-
cally noted that a lawyer's solicitation of clients does not require the use
of the specialized education and knowledge of the legal profession. 162
The appeals court affirmed the trial court's finding that Atlantic Lloyd's
was obligated to defend the firm in the Likover action. 163
In another professional services exclusion case, the court arrived at the
opposite conclusion. In State Farm Lloyds v. Performance Improvement
Corporation,64 Performance was sued by the mother of a child who was
allegedly molested on more than one occasion by an employee who had
been screened and tested by Performance for the apartment complex
where the child lived. Performance carried liability insurance with State
Farm. State Farm denied coverage to Performance based on an exclusion
which listed "management consultant" as the excluded professional ser-
vice. The underlying lawsuit alleged, among other things, that Perform-
ance was negligent in failing to check the criminal histories of potential
employees and failing to administer a test more capable of revealing devi-
ant or criminal tendencies or personality traits of potential employees.
No testimony presented at the trial of the underlying lawsuit indicated
that the test administered by Performance was in any way defective or
unreasonably dangerous. The San Antonio Court of Appeals held that
the undisputed facts established that the liability of Performance in the
underlying lawsuit was solely based on its performance of the profes-
sional service of management consulting. 165 Although Performance ar-
gued that the term "professional services" was ambiguous, the court
rejected the insured's position, holding that Performance's administration
of pre-employment testing fell within the professional services exclusion
to the policy.166
160. See id. at 477.
161. Id.
162. See id. at 478.
163. See id.
164. 974 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied).
165. See id. at 137.
166. See id. at 138.
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F. BUSINESS PURSUITS EXCLUSION
In State Farm Fire & Casualty v. Vaughan, 167 the Texas Supreme Court
did an about face from its decision in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Reed.' 68 As in Reed, Vaughan involved the application of the business
pursuits exclusion to a home-operated day care business. While the
Vaughans' infant son was in the care of Solis, Solis buckled him into a car
safety seat, threw a blanket over his head and left him in a closet. After
law enforcement officers discovered the Vaughan boy and other unat-
tended children, Solis was convicted of child endangerment. State Farm
refused to defend Solis on the basis of the business pursuits exclusion 69
when the Vaughans sued Solis for emotional distress.
The Vaughans sued State Farm to collect on their judgment against
Solis. The trial court granted summary judgment for State Farm on the
basis of the business pursuits exclusion. The court of appeals reversed
and remanded the summary judgment for trial. Before the Texas
Supreme Court, the Vaughans argued that because in-home child care is
an activity ordinarily incidental to a non-business pursuit, their claim
against Solis fell within the exception to the exclusion. Interestingly, the
Texas Supreme Court cited the Reed decision when it noted that "not
every difference in interpretation of a contract or an insurance policy
amounts to an ambiguity."1711 The court noted that because there was no
factual dispute that Solis' day care operation was full-time, for profit, and
regulated by the state, the question of the application of the business pur-
suits exclusion was a matter of law. The supreme court, in its per curiam
opinion, distinguished Reed17' by noting that the inquiry must focus on
the specific factual allegations against the insured.172 The Vaughan court
noted that while the basis for liability in Reed concerned an activity which
was ordinarily incidental to non-business pursuits, the litigation against
Solis centered solely on how she conducted her "business pursuit. '173
The Vaughan court explicitly rejected the court appeals' conclusion that
Reed "invariably stands for the proposition that, in the context of home
child care, the 'business pursuits' exclusion and exceptions are ambigu-
ous .... ,,174 The Vaughan court concluded that the business pursuits ex-
167. 968 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. 1998).
168. 873 S.W.2d 698, 699 (Tex. 1993).
169. The business pursuits exclusion in Solis' policy excluded coverage for "bodily in-
jury or property damage arising out of or in connection with a business engaged in by an
insured." 968 S.W.2d at 932. An exception to the exclusion stated that "this exclusion
does not apply to activities which are ordinarily incidental to non-business pursuits." Id.
170. Vaughan, 968 S.W.2d at 933 (citing Reed, 873 S.W.2d at 699, n.3; Forbau v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 876 S.W.2d 132, 134 (Tex. 1994)).
171. In Reed, a child crawled through a fence that separated a play area from the
Reeds' swimming pool and drowned in a puddle of water on a tarp covering the pool. The
Texas Supreme Court, holding that the business pursuits exclusion was ambiguous and did
not apply to the Reed suit, determined that the maintenance of the fence was ordinarily
incidental to a non-business pursuit. See 873 S.W.2d at 701 n.7.





clusion in Solis' homeowners policy was not ambiguous when viewed in
light of the "actual activity the Vaughans allege created Solis' liability. '1 75
The court affirmed summary judgment in favor of State Farm and ren-
dered judgment that the Vaughans take nothing.1 76
Little indication can be gleaned from the Vaughan court's opinion
about the real reason for its drastic departure from Reed. At least one
reference is made to Chief Justice Phillip's dissent in Reed.177 But critics
for both carriers and their insureds seem to have justifiable complaints
against the court for failing to clearly draft the Reed decision so that
lower courts could correctly interpret it.
IV. PROPERTY
A. DAMAGE TO FOUNDATION HELD COVERED
In Sharp v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance Co.,178 the Fifth Cir-
cuit considered whether damage to a residence caused by foundation
movement resulting from a plumbing leak beneath the house was covered
under a standard Texas homeowners policy. The Fifth Circuit held that
the policy was not ambiguous, and flatly rejected the Sharps' attempt to
gain coverage for the damage to their home. 179 But Sharp remained
good law for only a year before the Texas Supreme Court, in answering a
question of law certified by the Fifth Circuit, appeared to follow the pref-
erences of the Texas Department of Insurance to provide coverage for
this form of foundation damage. In Balandran v. Safeco Insurance Co., 80
the Balandrans sought coverage for the foundation damage to their home
as caused by an underground plumbing leak. Safeco, the homeowners
carrier, contended that the damage to the dwelling was not covered under
Coverage A of their Texas standard homeowners policy due to an exclu-
sion for "settling, cracking, bulging, shrinking or expansion of founda-
tions." 181 Coverage B of the policy specifically insured personal property
from "Accidental discharge, Leakage or Overflow from within a ... sys-
tem or household appliance," and advised that "Exclusions 1(a) through
1(h) under Section I exclusions do not apply to loss caused by this
peril."' 82 The Balandrans, however, argued that an "exclusion repeal
provision" in the personal property section of the policy applied to any
loss suffered by the insured, not just those specified in the personal prop-
erty section.' 83 Relying on the precedent of State Farm Life Insurance
175. Id. at 934.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. 115 F.3d 1258 (5th Cir. 1997).
179. See id. at 262.
180. 129 F.3d 747 (5th Cir. 1997), certified questions answered by, 972 S.W.2d 738 (Tex.
1998), answer to certified question conformed to, 148 F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 1998). Accord
Oram v. State Farm Lloyds, 977 S.W.2d 163, 166 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, no pet.).





Co. v. Beaston,184 Safeco asserted that the exclusion repeal provision
should not be taken from its context within the personal property
section. 185
The Texas Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the exclusion repeal
provision was subject to two reasonable interpretations. 86 The court
found the Balandran's interpretation was reasonable because the policy
on its face merely stated exclusion 1(h) did not apply to plumbing leaks; it
did not specifically limit the exclusion to personal property losses. 187 The
court stated that the location of the exclusion within Coverage B was not
determinative. 88 Moreover, Safeco's construction rendered part of the
policy meaningless. If exclusion 1(h) applied only to personal property,
the court reasoned, it was unnecessary even to list it because, on its face,
exclusion 1(h) applied to dwelling damages. 18 9 The court distinguished
several cases cited by Safeco supporting its contention that exclusion 1(h)
excludes damage to foundations regardless of cause because those cases
interpreted the standard pre-1978 homeowner's policy.' 9" Presented with
the ambiguity, the Texas Supreme Court held that uncertain contractual
language should be construed against the party selecting that language. 191
As a result, the court concluded that the Balandrans' interpretation of the
exclusion repeal provision was a reasonable and proper construction of
the policy. 192
B. FLOOD EXCLUSION
In State Farm Lloyds v. Marchetti,193 the Marchettis' house was dam-
aged when water and raw sewage backed up through a drain opening in
their utility room. As in the Balandran case, the Marchettis' homeowners
policy covered both the dwelling and personal property of the insureds.
State Farm denied the Marchettis' claim under their homeowners policy.
The Marchettis then obtained a summary judgment from the trial court
that their claim was covered. On appeal, the Marchettis asserted that the
loss was caused by the accidental discharge or overflow of water and sew-
age, a covered peril. State Farm contended that the flood and surface
water exclusion applied to the damage to the Marchettis' dwelling.' 94
State Farm maintained that it was excessive rainfall which was the cause
184. 907 S.W.2d 430, 433 (Tex. 1995).







192. Justices Owen and Hecht dissented from the majority, preferring to adopt the rea-
soning of the Fifth Circuit in Sharp. See Balandran, 972 S.W.2d at 743-46.
193. 962 S.W.2d 58 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. denied).
194. The flood and surface water exclusion read: "i. We do not cover loss caused by or
resulting from flood, surface water, waves, tidal water or tidal waves, overflow of streams
or other bodies of water or spray from any of these whether or not driven by wind."
Marchetti, 962 S.W.2d at 60.
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in fact of the discharge of water and sewage through the Marchettis'
drain. In affirming the summary judgment for the Marchettis, the court
noted that the fact that excessive surface water may have initiated the
chain of events which led to the insured's loss was immaterial.195 As a
result, the court held that when the insured's loss is a consequence of the
invasion of the insured premises by non-flood water, even though the in-
vasion may have been proximately caused by flood water, the flood and
surface water exclusion does not apply. 196
C. EMPLOYEE DISHONESTY
The insured in Lynch Properties, Inc. v. Potomac Insurance Co. of Illi-
nois197 sued its commercial crime insurer after the carrier denied cover-
age under the employee dishonesty coverage for misappropriation of
funds from customer's personal bank accounts by the insured's employee.
The district court granted Potomac's motion for summary judgment. The
Fifth Circuit noted that Potomac was obligated under the policy to pay
for loss to "Covered Property" resulting directly from a "Covered Cause
of Loss. ' 198 A provision in the policy, however, limited property loss cov-
erage for Lynch to property owned or held by the insured or for which
the insured was legally liable. Because the customer's funds were private
and kept in a separate account from the insured's accounts, the court held
the connection between the insured and customer's funds was tenuous,
primarily based on family ties, and that Lynch Properties did not hold or
rise to the level of being legally liable for the customer's property. 199
D. BUSINESS INTERRUPTION
In Quality Oilfield Products, Inc. v. Michigan Mutual Insurance Co.,200
Quality, a manufacturer of oilfield equipment used for drilling and pro-
duction, made a claim with Michigan for business interruption losses after
Quality's offices were burglarized and engineering drawings, computer
disks, and design information used to process orders were stolen. Michi-
gan denied the claim because Quality did not suspend operations as re-
quired by the policy. In its declaratory action, Michigan maintained that
it had no obligation to indemnify Quality for a work "slowdown." The
trial court agreed, granting Michigan a summary judgment. On appeal,
Quality argued that the policy's coverage for "loss resulting directly from
the necessary interruption of business caused by damage to or destruction
of real or personal property '20 1 included a work slowdown. Quality con-
tended that the phrase "interruption of business" did not mean the total
cessation, shutdown, or stoppage of business. The court of appeals dis-
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. 140 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 1998).
198. Id. at 626.
199. See id.
200. 971 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.).
201. Id. at 637 (emphasis in original).
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agreed, explaining that "the purpose of a business interruption policy is to
indemnify the insured for loss caused by the interruption of a going busi-
ness due to the destruction of the building, plant or parts thereof. '20 2
Noting the language of the policy itself was more restrictive than author-
ity cited by Quality, the court of appeals held the insured's loss of income
caused by a theft which adversely impacted its production was not cov-
ered under the Michigan policy because Quality remained open and con-
tinued to operate.2) 3
V. AUTOMOBILE
A. PIP BENEFITS
In Kim v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,2° 4 Kim was
involved in an automobile accident with an uninsured driver. State Farm,
her insurance carrier, paid her a total of $2,500 in personal injury protec-
tion (PIP) benefits and $7,500 in uninsured motorist (UM) benefits. Kim
claimed, however, that she was entitled to $10,000 in UM benefits in addi-
tion to the $2,500 PIP benefits. Kim filed a declaratory action seeking the
court's declaration that State Farm breached its contract and violated the
DTPA and the Insurance Code. Both Kim and State Farm agreed that
her total damages for bodily injury were $10,000. The trial court granted
State Farm's motion for summary judgment and Kim appealed, maintain-
ing that she was entitled to the full amount of her UM policy limits, and
that State Farm was not allowed to deduct her PIP payments from her
UM coverage.20 5 The court of appeals determined that the policy lan-
guage in contention was neither ambiguous nor uncertain when it stated
that State Farm agreed to pay all covered damages that were not previ-
ously paid or otherwise payable from another source, including PIP cov-
erage. Therefore, because the parties had stipulated $10,000 as the value
of Kim's bodily injury damages, the total amount owed to Kim was
$10,000, not $12,500. Kim argued that Dabney v. Home Insurance Co.20 6
prevented this decision because it held "that an insurer cannot legally
202. Id. at 638 (citing 1G COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 1:28 (2d ed. 1984)).
203. See id. at 639.
204. 966 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1998, no pet.).
205. There are two types of possible offsets with regard to PIP coverage: statutory and
contractual. The applicable statute is TEX. INS. CODE Art. 5.06-3(h), which states:
When any liability claim is made by any guest or passenger described in para-
graph (b) hereof against the owner or operator of the motor vehicle in which
he was riding or the owner's or operator's liability insurance carrier, the
owner or operator of such motor vehicle or his liability insurance carrier shall
be entitled to an offset, credit or deduction against any award made to such
guest or passenger in an amount of money equal to the amounts paid by the
owner, operator or his automobile liability insurance carrier under "personal
injury protection" as defined in this Act to such guests or passengers; pro-
vided, however, nothing herein shall be construed to authorize a direct action
against a liability insurance carrier if such right does not presently exist at
law.
TEX. INS. CODE art. 5.06-3 (h) (West 1998).
206. 643 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. 1983).
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offset payments made under PIP coverage against claims made under
UM coverage. '20 7 The Kim court distinguished Dabney because the Kim
case involved "a specific contract provision that allows offsets to prevent
recoveries in excess of actual damages. '208 The court affirmed summary
judgment on behalf of State Farm.209
In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Gerlich,210 Gerlich was driving
her vehicle when she was hit by an uninsured motorist. Gerlich was cov-
ered by a Nationwide policy that included both PIP and UM coverage.
The Nationwide policy contained a contractual offset in the UM coverage
identical to the one found in the Liberty policy issued to Goss. Nation-
wide initially paid Gerlich $2,200 in PIP benefits. Gerlich and Nation-
wide later settled her UM claim for $3,500. Nationwide asserted that it
was entitled to a credit for the PIP benefits it had previously paid to Ger-
lich. Nationwide issued a check for $1,300 to Gerlich in payment of the
settlement amount. On appeal, the court held that Nationwide had the
burden of proving that without the offset, Gerlich would obtain a double
recovery. 211 The parties had stipulated that the UM settlement was
$3,500, but did not stipulate that Gerlich's actual damages were $3,500.
The court of appeals seized upon this distinction in holding that Nation-
wide was not entitled to an offset.212
In addition, the Gerlich court referred to the holding in Dabney21 3
where the Texas Supreme Court cited Westchester Fire Insurance Co. v.
Tucker.214 In connection with the Dabney passage, Nationwide argued
that because the Westchester Fire court only held the offset provision was
ineffective to the extent it reduced the UM coverage below the minimum
limits required by art. 5.06-1,215 an offset provision is effective so long as
it does not reduce UM coverage below the minimum set by the legisla-
ture. The Gerlich court noted that the Dabney court "did not consider
whether offsetting the PIP benefits against the uninsured motorist protec-
tion would reduce the UM protection to an amount less than the mini-
mum limits set by the legislature,' 216 and that the UM limits of the
Haynes policy were not even set forth in the Dabney opinion. 21 7 There-
fore, the Gerlich court rejected Nationwide's attempt to validate its offset
provision by using the DabneylWestchester analysis.218 But the implica-
tion of the Gerlich court's discussion is that to the extent that a PIP offset
207. 966 S.W.2d at 779.
208. Id.
209. See id.
210. 982 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. granted).
211. See id.
212. See id. at 458.
213. 643 S.W.2d at 387 (Tex. 1982).
214. 512 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. 1974) (holding that an insurer was not entitled to set off
payments under medical payments coverage against claims made under uninsured motorist
coverage).
215. TEX. INS. CODE art. 5.06-1 (1) (Vernon 1998).





would reduce the available limits of the UM coverage below the statutory
minimum, then such offset provision may not be enforceable.
B. NOTIFICATION OF OWNERSHIP
In Foust v. Old American County Mutual Fire Insurance Co.,219 Foust
sued Old American to recover for hail damage to an automobile that he
claimed was covered by his existing insurance policy. Old American
claimed that the car was not covered under the policy because the car was
purchased for Foust's business. Old American also contended that even
if it was covered, Foust had failed to notify Old American within 30 days
of becoming the owner as required by the policy. The trial court granted
summary judgment for Old American. On appeal, Foust contended that
the certificate of title designated "Budget Auto-Todd Foust" as the
owner of the car. Foust maintained that even though "Budget Auto" was
a partnership that included another individual, the car was never in-
tended to become partnership property. The court of appeals noted that
Old American's policy could have required that Foust be the sole and
unconditional owner of the car. 220 However, because the policy did not
so specify, the court held Foust and Budget Auto were at least co-owners
of the car under the policy.221 In addition, the court held that because the
term "owner" has no definite legal meaning, such meaning must be based
upon established facts.222 The court stated that an insurable interest ex-
ists when the insured derives financial benefit by the preservation of
property, and loss from its damage. 223 Because Foust's payment for the
car took place on April 11th, Foust's physical possession of the car took
place on April 15th, and Foust filed his claim on May 11th, the court
ruled that Old American was given timely notice of Foust's ownership
because his claim was filed within the thirty days mandated by the policy.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's summary judgment and
rendered judgment for Foust.224
C. UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE
In Essman v. General Accident Insurance Co. of America,225 Essman
was involved in an auto accident with Trevino and Contreras. General
Accident, Essman's auto liability carrier, provided her with a defense in
the suit by Trevino and Contreras. At no time during the defense of the
underlying suit did Essman contend that either Trevino or Contreras
were responsible for her own injuries. Essman later settled with Trevino
and Contreras, and the parties entered into an agreed order of dismissal
219. 977 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, no pet.).
220. See id. at 787.
221. See id. at 787.
222. See id.
223. See id. (citing Smith v. Eagle Star Ins. Co., 370 S.W.2d 448, 450 (Tex. 1963); Jones
v. Texas Pacific Indemnity Co., 853 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no writ)).
224. See id. at 789.
225. 961 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, no pet.).
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stating they had settled and compromised all existing controversies be-
tween them. Shortly thereafter, Essman claimed uninsured motorist ben-
efits under her policy with General Accident in connection with the same
accident. General Accident denied Essman's claim for uninsured motor-
ist coverage because Essman was no longer legally entitled to recover
from the uninsured motorists in light of the settlement. Essman sued
General Accident for breach of contract and the trial court granted sum-
mary judgment for General Accident. The court of appeals affirmed on
the basis that an uninsured motorist carrier's liability to pay benefits to an
insured is limited to that which the insured is legally entitled to recover
from the tortfeasor. Under Texas law, the phrase "legally entitled to re-
cover" means the insured must be able to establish fault on the part of
the uninsured/underinsured motorist and the extent of damages.226
The Essman court held that the parties' agreed dismissal of the under-
lying tort case controlled the disposition of Essman's claim for uninsured
motorist benefits. 227 Because a judgment of dismissal entered by agree-
ment of the parties in pursuit of a compromise or settlement of a contro-
versy becomes a judgment on the merits, the Essman court noted that
such an agreed judgment is conclusive, not only on the matters actually
raised and litigated, but also on every other matter which the parties
might have litigated and had decided as an incident to or essentially con-
nected with the subject matter of the litigation.228 Thus, because the dis-
missal order acts as a judgment on the claims of Essman's suit against the
uninsured motorist, and the primary issue in Essman's suit against Gen-
eral Accident was determined in the first suit's judgment, Essman could
not establish the conditions precedent in order to trigger General Acci-
dent's obligation to pay under the uninsured motorist coverage. 229 Thus,
the court of appeals held that the trial court properly determined that the
dismissal order barred Essman from establishing her predicate for recov-
ery of uninsured motorist benefits. 230
D. COVERED AUTO
John Deere Insurance Co. v. Truckin' U.S.A. 231 arose out of a fatal col-
lision between a tractor trailer and the Kurocik family's automobile. The
heirs of the Kurociks sued Tompkins, the truck driver; Suits, Tompkins'
employer, individually and d/b/a Truckin' U.S.A.; Schmoe, Truckin'
226. Id. at 573 (citing Franco v. Allstate Ins. Co., 505 S.W.2d 789, 792 (Tex. 1974);
United Serv. Auto. Ass'n v. Blakemore, 782 S.W.2d 277, 279 (Tex. App.-Waco 1989, writ
denied); Members Mut. Ins. Co. v. Clancy, 455 S.W.2d 447, 448 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1970, no writ)).
227. See id. at 574.
228. See id. (citing Rhoades v. Prudential Leasing Corp., 413 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1967, no writ); Murray v. Murray, 611 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1981, no writ) (res judicata barred plaintiff's second suit because plaintiff entered into
agreed dismissal even though claims were dismissed without prejudice)).
229. See id.
230. See id.
231. 122 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 1997).
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U.S.A.'s other principal owner; and Copp Trucking, Inc., the company
whose name appeared on the tractor rig. Truckin' U.S.A. held an insur-
ance policy with John Deere. Copp Trucking was insured by Transport.
Transport settled all claims against Copp Trucking and Tompkins for
$600,000. Transport's settlement on behalf of Tompkins was limited to
the extent that he was considered an employee of Copp Trucking. The
petition was later amended, dropping Copp Trucking as a defendant and
alleging that Tompkins was an employee of Suits, Schmoe, and Truckin'
U.S.A., and that a "working agreement" existed between those three de-
fendants and Copp Trucking. Transport demanded reimbursement from
Deere for the $600,000 settlement alleging that, because Copp Trucking
was insured under the policy, Deere had a duty to defend and indemnify
Copp and a concomitant duty to reimburse Transport for the settlement.
Deere brought a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination
that it had no duty to defend, indemnify, or reimburse Copp Trucking
because (1) the rig involved in the Kurocik accident was not a "covered
auto," and (2) Copp Trucking was not an "insured" under the Deere pol-
icy. The district court granted summary judgment for Deere.
Before the Fifth Circuit, Transport first argued that the district court
violated the "complaint allegation rule" by considering evidence extrinsic
to the pleadings in making its determination whether Deere had an obli-
gation under the policy to defend or indemnify either Copp Trucking or
Transport.232 Examining the complaint, the Fifth Circuit held that the
allegations were insufficient to determine coverage, even if taken as
true.233 The policy only covered claims resulting from the ownership,
maintenance, or use of a "covered auto." Since the Kurocik heirs failed
to allege facts sufficient to determine whether the tractor/trailer rig was
covered under the policy, the court held that district court properly con-
sidered extrinsic evidence. 234
Transport next argued that the district court erred in holding that the
rig was not a "covered auto" under the Deere policy. Under the Deere
policy, a "covered auto" was an auto specifically scheduled on the pol-
icy,235 or one that met the definition of a "substitute auto,"2 36 an "after
232. Under the complaint allegation rule, an insurer's duty to defend is determined
solely from the face of the plaintiff's complaint without reference to extrinsic evidence.
However, if the complaint does not allege sufficient facts to state a cause of action under
the policy, extrinsic evidence may be properly considered. See 112 F.3d at 272 (citing
Rhodes v. Chicago Ins. Co., 719 F.2d 116,119 (5th Cir. 1983); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Wade, 827 S.W.2d 448, 452 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied); Cook v. Ohio
Cas. Ins. Co., 418 S.W.2d 712, 714-15 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1967, no writ)).
233. See 122 F.3d at 272.
234. See id.
235. There was no dispute the rig was not a scheduled vehicle. See 122 F.3d at 273, n.2.
236. The Deere policy defined a "substitute auto" as "Any 'auto' [that Truckin' U.S.A.]
do[es] not own while used with the permission of its owner as a temporary substitute for a
covered 'auto' that is out of service because of [various reasons]." Id. at 273.
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acquired auto," 237 or an "undescribed trailer." In determining whether
the rig was a "substitute auto," the court held that Transport's proof was
insufficient to determine ownership.238 Deposition testimony by Suits in-
dicated that he had a practice of purchasing Copp Trucking rigs for
Truckin' U.S.A.'s use without removing the Copp Trucking label. The
court held Suits' testimony only established that the truck was labeled
"Copp Trucking" and did not demonstrate ownership. 239 Therefore, the
court held that the rig was not a "substitute auto" under the Deere policy.
With respect to whether the rig was an "undescribed trailer," the court
held that the Deere policy provided coverage for "undescribed trailers"
only if they were attached to a scheduled power unit. 240 Transport ar-
gued that the district court erred in relying on this requirement because
language in the schedule provided an independent basis for coverage for
"undescribed trailers, while in the care, custody, and control of the in-
sured. ' 241 The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument since neither Trans-
port or Copp Trucking qualified as "insureds" under the Deere policy. 242
The court stated that even if the trailer was covered as an "undescribed
trailer," Deere would have only a duty to defend and indemnify Truckin'
U.S.A. and not Copp Trucking or Transport.
Transport also argued that Copp Trucking was an "insured" under pol-
icy language which included "anyone liable for the conduct of an insured
described above but only to the extent of that liability. '243 Transport ar-
gued this language provided coverage to Copp, and therefore to Trans-
port, on the basis that Copp Trucking was sued for damages arising out of
the actions of Tompkins, a Truckin' U.S.A. employee. Since Transport
had paid $600,000 to settle the claims against Copp Trucking, Copp
Trucking and Transport's "liability" was due to the actions of Truckin'
U.S.A., thereby making Copp Trucking an "insured" under the policy.
The court rejected this argument on the grounds that neither Copp Truck-
ing nor Transport was legally "liable" for the conduct of Truckin' U.S.A.,
its employees, or any other "insureds" under the policy.244 The court
stated that even though Transport voluntarily settled the Kurocik claims
for Copp Trucking to the extent that Tompkins was considered an em-
ployee of Copp Trucking, such actions did not make either Copp Truck-
ing or Transport legally "liable" for the conduct of Truckin' U.S.A. or its
employees. 245 Finally, Transport argued that an endorsement to the pol-
icy providing that Deere was obliged to pay any final judgment recovered
237. An "after-acquired auto" under the Deere policy was one that replaced an auto
that the insured previously owned, provided that the insured informed the carrier within 30
days after the acquisition that it wanted coverage for the vehicle. See id.
238. See id.
239. See id.
240. See 122 F.3d at 273-74.







against the insured regardless of whether or not the motor vehicles in-
volved were described in the policy mandated indemnification to Trans-
port for its payments. The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument, stating
that since Copp Trucking was not an insured under the policy, the en-
dorsement provided no grounds for indemnification. 246
VI. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
A. CARRIER NEED NOT PROVE BENEFITS REASONABLE
AND NECESSARY
In Texas Workers' Compensation Insurance Fund v. Serrano,247 the
Texas Supreme Court determined whether the insurance carrier must
prove the amount of benefits paid was reasonable and necessary before it
is entitled to reimbursement. Serrano sued a truck's driver and owner
after suffering a disabling accident at work. The Serranos settled, but the
district court refused to authorize reimbursement for the medical benefits
paid by the workers' compensation carrier because the insurer failed to
prove that each amount was reasonable and necessary. The court of ap-
peals affirmed the lower court. The Texas Supreme Court acknowledged
that while Texas Labor Code Section 417.002(a) requires that a compen-
sation carrier be reimbursed out of any third-party recovery for all bene-
fits paid for an injury, the statute does not limit reimbursement to only
those benefits deemed reasonable and necessary. 248 Consequently, the
court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the
case for reconsideration. 249
B. MISTAKEN BELIEF OF "EMPLOYEE" STATUS IS NOT BAD FAITH
In Alvarado v. Old Republic Insurance,250 passengers in an automobile
accident filed claims for workers' compensation benefits. Old Republic
denied the passengers' claims on the basis that they were not employees
of its insured, U.S. Home. The passengers sued Old Republic for breach
of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The court held, in accordance
with State Farm Lloyds v. Nicolau, 51 that an insurer may negate an es-
sential element of a bad faith claim by showing that its liability was not
reasonably clear because there was a reasonable basis for believing that a
claim was not covered.252 Given the policy's definition of "employee,"
the court held that there was a reasonable basis for believing that the
passengers were not employees of U.S. Home. For that reason, the court
affirmed summary judgment for Old Republic and denied workers' com-
pensation benefits to the passengers.
246. See id.
247. 962 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. 1998).
248. See id. at 538.
249. See id.
250. 951 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no writ).
251. 951 S.W.2d 444 (Tex. 1997).
252. See 951 S.W.2d at 258.
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C. FAILURE TO CONTEST COMPENSABILITY
In Continental Casualty Co. v. Williamson,253 NIBCO employed Wil-
liamson and carried workers' compensation insurance with Continental.
Williamson claimed he suffered injuries to his right leg during a fall at
work in March 1993. Williamson returned to light duty work at NIBCO
in late July 1993 against his wishes. In August 1993, Williamson claimed
to have fallen again, suffering injuries to his left leg, back, neck, shoulders
and head. After the second fall, NIBCO's plant safety director immedi-
ately took Williamson to the doctor, who determined that Williamson had
suffered no additional injuries and returned him to work. Instead of re-
turning to work, Williamson requested vacation time until previously
scheduled knee surgery could be performed. After the knee surgery, Wil-
liamson was released by his physician to return to light duty work.
Shortly after returning to work, Williamson claimed to have suffered a
third fall in the NIBCO restroom. At the contested case hearing, the
hearing officer determined that Williamson had suffered no injury within
the course and scope of his employment at the time of his alleged fall in
August 1993, but that more than sixty days had elapsed from the time of
the fall and Continental's contest of the compensability of that claim.254
The Commission determined that even though Williamson suffered no
injury, because Continental did not timely contest compensability, Wil-
liamson's injury was established as a matter of law.255 The court of ap-
peals, however, noted that "[an injury and a compensable injury are two
different animals. '256 The court noted that because Continental persisted
in its position that Williamson never suffered an injury, the issue of com-
pensability never arose. 257 The court held that while Continental may
have waived its rights to contest the compensability of Williamson's in-
jury, it never waived its right to contest the injury itself.258 Accordingly,
the court held that if a hearing officer determines no injury occurred, and
that finding is not against the great weight and preponderance of the evi-
dence, the workers' compensation carrier's failure to contest compen-
sability cannot create an injury as a matter of law.259
253. 971 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1998, no pet.).
254. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 409.021 (Vernon 1998) provides: "If an insurance carrier
does not contest the compensability of an injury on or before the 60th day after the date on
which the insurance carrier is notified of the injury, the insurance carrier waives its right to
contest compensability."




259. See id. at 110-11. The Williamson court did note that a carrier elects to waive its
contest of compensability at its own peril. If the Commission fails to agree with the car-
rier's assessment of no injury, then the carrier waives its defenses to compensability under
TEX. LAB. CODE § 409.021. Id. at 111, n. 2.
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VII. LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE
In Stillwagoner v. Travelers Insurance Co.,260 Stillwagoner was em-
ployed on a temporary basis by Advantage Medical Services, Inc., an in-
home health care services provider. Without her knowledge, Advantage
obtained an accidental death policy on Stillwagoner and other employees
from Travelers. Stillwagoner was killed after her company-owned vehicle
collided with another car. Advantage's president, Lummus, tearfully de-
nied the existence of any insurance coverage when Stillwagoner's family
inquired. Travelers denied policy benefits to Advantage on the basis that
Stillwagoner died outside the scope of her employment. Travelers ulti-
mately settled with Advantage, but paid no money to Stillwagoner's sur-
vivors or estate. The family sued Advantage, Lummus and Travelers,
contending that Stillwagoner's employer had no insurable interest in her
life.
After determining that Stillwagoner's estate was entitled to raise the
issue of no insurable interest, the court addressed Advantage's creative
argument that, as a non-subscriber to the Texas Workers' Compensation
System, it was compelled to purchase the Travelers policy to defend and
resolve any negligence suits that might be brought by the family of an
employee who suffered a job-related accidental death. While Texas cor-
porations have an insurable interest in the lives of officers and stockhold-
ers "to whom the other stockholders [look] primarily for the success of
the business" or "on whose services the corporation depends for its pros-
perity, and whose death will be the cause of a substantial loss to it,"261 the
court found that Stillwagoner met none of these requirements. 262
Under the evidence developed, Stillwagoner was a temporary em-
ployee hired two months before her death and replaced by Advantage
the day after her death. Advantage was unable to identify any referrals
produced by Stillwagoner or show any diminution in business caused by
her death. Moreover, the court held that liability insurance, rather than
life insurance, is the appropriate means of insuring against potential neg-
ligence suits by survivors of employees who die on the job.263 Because
liability insurance would only indemnify the insured up to amount of the
actual loss, while life insurance paid a certain sum regardless of actual
damages, the court likened the policy held by Advantage to a wagering
contract on Stillwagoner's life.264 The court concluded that because Ad-
vantage had no insurable interest in Stillwagoner's life, the proceeds of
the policy were appropriately payable to Stillwagoner's estate under the
Insurance Code.265
260. 979 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1998, no pet.).
261. Id. at 361 (citing McBride v. Clayton, 140 Tex. 71,166 S.W.2d 125, 128-29 (1942)).
262. See id. at 362.
263. See id. at 363.
264. See id.




A. DUTY TO RECOMMEND COVERAGE
In Moore v. Whitney-Vaky Insurance Agency, 266 Moore was ap-
proached by McClain, an agent of Whitney-Vaky, who sought to manage
the insurance for an apartment complex Moore had recently repossessed.
Although McClain did not discuss any types of coverage specifically with
Moore, Moore assumed that he would receive fire, extended coverage,
liability and workers' compensation coverage because he had received
such packages in similar situations. Moore did not discuss the details of
the policy with McClain after the policy was delivered. Five years later,
an employee filed suit after being fired, claiming retaliatory discharge.
Moore believed that the claim was covered under the liability policy he
had purchased from McClain, but he discovered that it was not. Moore
sued the carrier, Whitney-Vaky, and McClain for negligence, breach of
contract, fraud, and DTPA and Insurance Code violations. Moore
claimed that he was led to believe that all liabilities were covered under
the policy by Whitney-Vaky, Del McClain, and their agents.
After the insurance company was nonsuited, Whitney-Vaky and Mc-
Clain filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that since neither
party disputed whether McClain or any other Whitney-Vaky employee
ever indicated to Moore that he was provided coverage, the only issue
was whether a duty existed on the part of McClain and/or Whitney-Vaky
to advise Moore of the coverage provided by the policy. The trial court
granted summary judgment for Whitney-Vaky and McClain.
On appeal, both parties cited May v. United Services Association of
America,267 to support their positions on the scope of an insurance
agent's common-law duty to a customer regarding advice about and pro-
curing a policy for insurance. Under May, a health insurance decision, an
insurance agent owes a client the common-law duties to (1) use reason-
able diligence in attempting to places requested insurance; and (2) inform
the client promptly if unable to do so. 268 However, the May court did not
decide whether agent liability extended beyond an agent's misrepresenta-
tions to an agent's failure to disclose limitations in the policy's coverage.
The May court noted that other jurisdictions were willing to make such
an extension of liability where there was an "explicit agreement, a course
of dealing, or other evidence establishing an undertaking by the agent to
determine the customer's insurance needs and to counsel the customer as
to how they can best be met."2 69
The court noted that although Moore claimed a "special relationship"
with his agent, Moore failed to prove that their association was anything
more than the perfunctory annual renewal of his insurance policy.2 70 The
266. 966 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.).
267. 844 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. 1992).
268. See id. at 669.




court held that even if a duty to disclose was based upon a "special rela-
tionship," Moore's case provided insufficient evidence that such a rela-
tionship existed.271 The court also rejected Moore's claims for DTPA and
Insurance Code violations.2 72 Maintaining that the insured's belief about
the scope of its policy is only actionable after a specific misrepresentation
by the insurer, Moore's testimony that McClain never explained the pol-
icy in question to cover all lawsuits led the court to believe that no spe-
cific misrepresentations had been made concerning the insurance.2 73
Accordingly, the court held that neither Whitney-Vaky nor McClain
owed Moore a common law or statutory duty to disclose any limitation in
Moore's insurance coverage. 274
B. AGENTS ARE NOT CONSUMERS
In Tweedell v. Hochheim Prairie Farm Mutual Insurance Association,275
insurance agents Tweedell, Hicks, and White were authorized to sell
property and casualty insurance for the Hochheim Companies. In 1990,
the Hochheim Companies terminated the agents' sales representative and
agency contracts and refused to renew all policies issued by the agents
because of overall combined high loss ratios from 1986 to 1989. The
agents sued the Hochheim Companies and others under the DTPA276 and
article 21.21 of the Insurance Code.277 The Hochheim Companies ob-
tained a summary judgment based on the agents' lack of standing to as-
sert the statutory causes of action. The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals
determined that the agents failed to qualify as "consumers" under the
DTPA.278 The court noted that although the agents purchased insurance
policies for themselves from the Hochheim Companies, these policies
were not the basis of their claims. 279 Moreover, even though the agents
alleged that they sought the carrier's products or services for their cus-
tomers, the products or services were not obtained by the agents through
lease or purchase.
The court then examined whether the agents qualified as "persons" 280
271. See id.
272. See id.
273. See id. at 693.
274. See id.
275. 962 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.).
276. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41 el seq. (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1998).
277. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1998).
278. To have a cause of action under § 17.50 of the DTPA, a claimant must be a con-
sumer. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50; Transport Ins. Co. v. Faircloth, 898
S.W.2d 269, 274 (Tex. 1995). Section '17.45 of the DTPA defines consumer as "an individ-
ual, partnership, corporation, this state or agency of this state who seeks or acquires by
purchase or lease, any goods or services." TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45 (4).
(Vernon 1987).
279. See 962 S.W.2d at 687.
280. Under article 21.21 of the Insurance Code, a "person" is defined as "any individ-
ual, corporation, association, partnership, reciprocal exchange, inter-insurer, Lloyds in-
surer, fraternal benefit society, and any other legal entity engaged in the business of
insurance, including agents, brokers, adjusters, and life insurance counselors." TEX. INs.
CODE ANN. art 21.21, § 2 (a) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
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under article 21.21 of the Insurance Code. 28' The Hochheim Companies
argued that only insureds or beneficiaries of an insurance policy have
standing to file an article 21.21 claim. The court of appeals noted that
section 16(a) of article 21.21 "clearly grants standing to any person who
has sustained actual damages as a result of another's engaging in an act or
practice declared in section 4 of article 21.21 to be unfair methods of
competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the business of
insurance. '282 Accordingly, the court held that because agents are in-
cluded as in the definition of "person," any agent who suffers actual dam-
ages because of another person's engaging in activities listed in article
21.21, section 4 of the Insurance Code or by section 17.46 of the Business
and Commerce Code has standing to bring a cause of action under article
21.21 of the Insurance Code.283
281. Section 16 (a) of article 21.21 provides:
Any person who has sustained actual damages as a result of another's engag-
ing in an act or practice declared in Section 4 of this Article or in the rules or
regulations lawfully adopted by the Board under this Article to be unfair
methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the busi-
ness of insurance or in any practice defined by Section 17.46 of the Business
& Commerce Code, as amended, as an unlawful deceptive trade practice may
maintain an action against the person or persons engaging in such acts or
practices.
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16 (a) (Vernon 1991 & Supp. 1998).
282. 962 S.W.2d at 689.
283. See id.
19991 1321
1322 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52
